A warning for Europe’s fight against financial crime
On 3rd September, a judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union in Jautiva, Case C-798/24, raises an uncomfortable question for Europe’s financial-crime framework: are we making it harder to see the ownership structures that criminals and sanctions evaders rely on?
The Court held that EU law does not require Member States to disclose information relating to all shareholders of public limited liability companies, including minority shareholders. It also found that unrestricted online access to detailed personal data about such shareholders — especially where data can be downloaded in bulk by unidentified users — is incompatible with EU data-protection law unless access is subject to conditions such as demonstrating a legitimate interest.
The privacy concerns are real. No one should be casual about publishing personal identification numbers, contact details or information that can be used to profile an individual’s wealth and investments. But the potential unintended consequence is also real: if access to ownership information becomes too restricted, fragmented or uncertain, Europe risks creating additional blind spots for those seeking to launder money, conceal control or evade sanctions.
This matters because sanctions evasion rarely depends on obvious ownership. It often relies on minority stakes, indirect holdings, nominee shareholders, family members, corporate layers, trusts and cross-border structures that are deliberately designed to obscure influence and economic benefit. If investigators, regulated firms, journalists, civil society and specialist data providers cannot access or connect relevant ownership data quickly and lawfully, the result is not better privacy alone — it may also be slower investigations, weaker due diligence and more opportunities for illicit actors to hide in plain sight.
The Global Coalition to Fight Financial Crime, Open Ownership and LSEG Risk Intelligence made this point clearly in Connecting ownership data: Practical pathways to tackle cross-border financial crime. The report notes that more than 100 jurisdictions now collect beneficial ownership data, but that fragmented and disconnected systems are still limiting the ability of authorities and businesses to trace complex cross-border ownership structures and detect financial crime. Its central message is that ownership data must be accessible, standardised, interoperable and usable at scale if it is to have real-world impact.
The risk after this ruling is that policymakers respond by narrowing access without building the alternative infrastructure that enforcement actually needs. A legitimate-interest model can work, but only if it is clear, fast, consistent and available to those with a demonstrable role in preventing money laundering, corruption, tax abuse and sanctions evasion. If access is slow, discretionary or inconsistent across Member States, criminals will exploit the gaps.
The answer is not indiscriminate publication of every data point. But nor should the answer be opacity by default. Europe needs a smarter transparency model: proportionate safeguards for individuals, verified and high-quality data, interoperable registers, secure access channels, and clearly defined access rights for competent users. Otherwise, a ruling designed to protect fundamental rights could inadvertently weaken the very systems needed to protect society from serious financial crime and sanctions evasion.